The Art of Observing in a Given Situation the Available Means of Persuasion

Rhetoric may exist divers as the faculty of observing in any given case the bachelor ways of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular discipline-affair; for instance, medicine virtually what is good for you and unhealthy, geometry virtually the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we expect upon equally the ability of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical graphic symbol, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker simply are in that location at the outset -- witnesses, evidence given nether torture, written contracts, and then on. Past the quondam I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The i kind has simply to exist used, the other has to be invented.

[1356a] Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word at that place are three kinds. The get-go kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the 2nd on putting the audience into a sure frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided past the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech communication is so spoken as to make u.s. think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more than readily than others: this is true by and large whatsoever the question is, and absolutely truthful where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, similar the others, should be achieved past what the speaker says, not past what people retrieve of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, every bit some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes aught to his power of persuasion; on the reverse, his grapheme may almost be called the most effective ways of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the spoken communication stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the spoken language itself when nosotros have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

There are, and then, these three ways of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in control of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to empathise human character and goodness in their diverse forms, and (3) to empathize the emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and too of ethical studies. Upstanding studies may adequately exist chosen political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades every bit political scientific discipline, and the professors of it as political experts-sometimes from want of teaching, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. Equally a thing of fact, it is a co-operative of dialectic and like to it, as we said at the commencement. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific report of any i carve up subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is peradventure a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.

With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or [1356b] apparent proof: just as in dialectic in that location is induction on the i hand and syllogism or credible syllogism on the other, then it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the instance a rhetorical induction. Every one who furnishings persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: at that place is no other style. And since every ane who proves annihilation at all is bound to utilize either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics ), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The departure between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When nosotros base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, instance in rhetoric; when it is shown that, sure propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in result, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like style, some orators are ameliorate at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are equally persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we volition discuss later on. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more than clearly.

A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are then. In either case it is persuasive considering in that location is somebody whom it persuades. Merely none of the arts theorize about private cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize almost what volition help to cure Socrates or Callias, merely but about what will assist to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this lonely is business organization: individual cases are so infinitely diverse that no systematic noesis of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given private like Socrates or Hippias, only with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is truthful of dialectic also. Dialectic does non construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such equally the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate. [1357a] The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters every bit we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot accept in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such every bit seem to present u.s.a. with alternative possibilities: about things that could not take been, and cannot now or in the time to come be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.

It is possible to grade syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms; or, on the other manus, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are and so little accustomed that they telephone call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be difficult to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind volition fail to win assent, considering they are based on premisses that are not mostly admitted or believed.

The enthymeme and the case must, then, deal with what is in the principal contingent, the example being an consecration, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which brand up the normal syllogism. For if whatsoever of these propositions is a familiar fact, in that location is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a competition for which the prize is a crown, information technology is enough to say "For he has been victor in the Olympic games," without adding "And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown," a fact which everybody knows.

There are few facts of the "necessary" type that can form the ground of rhetorical syllogisms. Near of the things near which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, nowadays united states of america with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that nosotros deliberate and inquire, and all our actions take a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Once again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must exist drawn from premisses that do the same, merely as 'necessary' conclusions must be drawn from "necessary" premisses; this too is clear to us from the Analytics . Information technology is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be "necessary," will about of them be but usually true. At present the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must represent respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily truthful. A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but just if it belongs to the class of the "contingent" or "variable." Information technology bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the item. [1357b] Of Signs, ane kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the item bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the detail. The infallible kind is a "complete proof" (tekmerhiou); the fallible kind has no specific name. Past infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows united states of america why this kind of Sign is called "consummate proof": when people call back that what they take said cannot exist refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a "complete proof," meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed (peperhasmeuou ); for the discussion perhas has the same significant (of "cease" or "boundary") as the word tekmarh in the aboriginal tongue. Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition information technology supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose information technology were said, "The fact that Socrates was wise and merely is a sign that the wise are only." Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, information technology were said, "The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is sick," or, "The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child." Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a consummate proof, since it is the simply kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of Sign, that which bears to the suggestion it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, "The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever." This statement also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe difficult without having a fever.

It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a Probability, of a Sign, and of a consummate proof, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics a more than explicit clarification has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings tin be put into syllogisms and some cannot.

The "example" has already been described as 1 kind of consecration; and the special nature of the subject area-matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the proffer information technology supports is non that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or similar to like. When ii statements are of the aforementioned lodge, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an "example." The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking equally he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a bodyguard in lodge to conduct out such a scheme, and did make himself a autocrat every bit soon equally he got it; and then did Theagenes at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in guild to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these beingness instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. [1358a] We have at present described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to exist demonstrative.

There is an important distinction betwixt two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody -- one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme actually belongs to rhetoric, every bit 1 sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already do or to those we have not yet caused. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular field of study the farther they are getting abroad from pure rhetoric or dialectic. This argument will exist clearer if expressed more than fully. I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that take nothing to do with one another. Have, for instance, the line of statement concerned with 'the more than or less'. On this line of argument information technology is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects -- right carry, natural scientific discipline, or anything else whatever. But there are also those special Lines of Argument which are based on such propositions as apply but to particular groups or classes of things. Thus in that location are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base whatsoever enthymeme or syllogism near ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which cipher can be based about natural science. The same principle applies throughout. The general Lines of Argument have no special subject field-matter, and therefore will non increment our understanding of whatever particular class of things. On the other manus, the better the pick one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a scientific discipline that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one'due south scientific discipline volition exist no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered vest. About enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument; insufficiently few on the common or general kind. As in the Topics , therefore, so in this piece of work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be founded. By special Lines of Statement I hateful the propositions peculiar to each several grade of things, past full general those common to all classes alike. We may brainstorm with the special Lines of Statement. Simply, first of all, permit us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ.

wilbankscoperfell.blogspot.com

Source: https://kairos.technorhetoric.net/stasis/2017/honeycutt/aristotle/rhet1-2.html

Share this post